Should companies reward CEOs for being lucky? by Vikander, Nick
Should	companies	reward	CEOs	for	being	lucky?
A	puzzling	feature	of	chief	executive	officer	(CEO)	compensation	is	“pay	for	luck”.	Why	are	CEOs	often	rewarded
when	their	firms	perform	well	for	reasons	that	are	beyond	their	control?	The	dominant	advice	from	academia	is	to	do
just	the	opposite:	pay	CEOs	based	on	corporate	outcomes	they	can	substantially	influence,	which	gives	them
incentives	to	make	the	good	decisions	that	shareholders	expect.
Our	research	helps	resolve	the	puzzle	of	“pay	for	luck”	by	showing	that	firms	may	want	to	reward	CEOs	for	being
lucky,	if	luck	makes	it	easier	for	the	firm	to	keep	its	promises	to	the	CEO	concerning	pay.	Our	rationale	is	based	on
two	key	features:	many	firms	have	discretion	over	whether	to	pay	bonuses	to	the	CEO,	and	firms	care	about
sustaining	the	long-term	employment	relationship	with	the	CEO.	Our	results	from	analysing	the	compensation	plans
of	a	broad	sample	of	American	CEOs	support	this	rationale.
In	addition	to	puzzling	academic	researchers,	CEO	pay	for	luck	tends	to	anger	shareholders	and	the	public.	In	April
2018,	Persimmon	CEO	Jeff	Fairburn	received	a	bonus	of	£75	million,	reported	as	possibly	the	largest	bonus	ever	for
a	UK-listed	company,	based	on	high	corporate	profits.	The	bonus	was	narrowly	approved	after	a	shareholder	revolt,
with	critics	arguing	that	rising	profits	were	largely	due	to	something	beyond	the	CEO’s	control:	the	UK	government’s
“help	to	buy”	policy,	which	had	lifted	housing	prices	and	sales	across	the	country.	One	month	later,	after	intense
debate,	shareholders	approved	a	£7.8m	bonus	for	Shell	CEO	Ben	Van	Beurden.	Firm	earnings	had	tripled	from	2016
to	2017,	due	largely	to	changes	in	the	external	business	environment,	namely	rising	prices	for	crude	oil	and	natural
gas.
Sign	up	for	our	newsletter	here.
Sometimes	CEO	pay	for	luck	arises	due	to	a	poorly	designed	compensation	package,	or	a	cozy	relationship	between
the	firm	compensation	committee	and	the	CEO,	which	can	destroy	firm	value.	Our	research	shows	that,	at	times,
paying	the	CEO	for	luck	can	actually	increase	firm	performance.
Specifically,	we	develop	a	theoretical	model	showing	that	pay	for	luck	may	increase	firm	profits,	but	only	if	luck	is
persistent	(i.e.,	positively	correlated	over	time).	That	is,	only	if	factors	beyond	the	CEO’s	control	that	increase	current
profits	are	also	likely	to	increase	future	profits.	For	example,	a	government	policy	that	stimulated	home	sales	in
recent	years	may	well	do	the	same	for	years	to	come,	and	oil	prices	that	increased	in	the	recent	past	may	well
remain	high	in	the	near	future.	Such	persistence	implies	that	a	firm	that	earns	high	profits	due	to	“good	luck”	today
can	expect	high	profits	due	to	more	good	luck	tomorrow.
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Why	might	firms	that	experience	good	luck	today,	and	as	a	result	expect	high	profits	in	the	future,	pay	their	CEO	a
higher	bonus?	The	reason	is	that	the	relationship	between	a	firm	and	CEO	is	based	in	part	on	informal	promises	and
agreements,	rather	than	just	on	formal	signed	contracts.	A	firm	that	promises	to	pay	the	CEO	a	large	bonus	for	good
performance	may	later	have	the	discretion	to	refuse	to	pay	the	full	bonus	that	was	promised.	The	downside	of
breaking	this	promise	is	that	the	CEO	might	leave	the	firm,	which	reduces	future	profits.
A	firm	that	expects	high	future	profits,	even	if	largely	due	to	luck,	will	have	a	greater	interest	in	retaining	the	CEO,	so
will	be	more	likely	to	honor	its	informal	commitments.	Such	a	firm	can	promise	to	pay	a	relatively	high	bonus	in
situations	where	the	CEO	has	performed	well	and	the	firm	has	experienced	good	luck.	This	promise	will	induce	the
CEO	to	perform	better,	because	she	realizes	the	firm	will	actually	want	to	keep	its	promises,	and	pay	the	bonus	when
luck	is	good.
Our	empirical	work	also	provides	support	for	our	theoretical	results	on	pay	for	luck.	We	start	by	combining
information	from	two	databases,	Compustat	and	ExecuComp,	which	describe	firm	characteristics,	firm	performance,
and	CEO	compensation,	for	a	large	sample	of	American	publicly	traded	companies.	To	construct	a	measure	of	luck,
we	apply	a	statistical	tool	to	each	firm’s	sales	over	time,	to	obtain	a	measure	that	can	be	interpreted	as	the	business
cycle	for	that	particular	firm.	Just	as	most	firms	tend	to	do	better	in	an	economic	boom	than	in	a	bust,	for	reasons
beyond	the	CEO’s	control,	our	measure	describes	when	each	firm	experiences	good	and	bad	luck.
Using	this	empirical	measure,	we	show	that	firms	in	our	sample	do	indeed	pay	for	luck.	That	is,	CEOs	tend	to	receive
higher	pay	when	the	value	of	our	measure	corresponds	to	good	luck	rather	than	bad.	We	also	show	that	this	effect	is
stronger	when	luck	is	persistent.	CEO	pay	tends	to	depend	more	on	our	measure	of	luck	for	firms	where	that
measure	is	more	persistent,	so	where	a	value	corresponding	to	good	luck	today	is	often	associated	with	a	similar
value	in	the	future.
It	is	often	said	that	“You	make	your	own	luck”.	One	interpretation	is	that	talented	and	creative	individuals	are	good	at
recognising	unexpected	opportunities	and	seizing	them	to	create	the	conditions	for	even	more	good	opportunities	in
the	future.	This	means	that	talented	CEOs	can,	in	part,	create	the	persistence	in	luck	that	our	research	has	shown
justifies	pay	for	luck.	This	amplifies	the	benefits	of	using	pay	for	luck	in	CEO	compensation,	and	it	means	that	using
pay	for	luck	gives	CEOs	incentives	to	leverage	unexpected	opportunities	so	as	to	create	fertile	conditions	for	more
such	opportunities	to	arise	in	the	future.
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Notes:
This	blog	post	is	based	on	the	authors’	paper	Non-performance	Pay	and	Relational	Contracting:	Evidence	from
CEO	Compensation,	co-authored	with	Jed	DeVaro	and	Jin-Hyuk	Kim,	The	Economic	Journal,	August	2018.
The	post	gives	the	views	of	its	authors,	not	the	position	of	the	institutions	they	represent,	the	LSE	Business
Review	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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Nick	Vikander	is	an	assistant	professor	of	economics	at	the	University	of	Copenhagen.	His	research
consists	mainly	of	applied	theoretical	work	in	the	fields	of	industrial	organisation	and	organisational
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team	incentives,	relational	contracting	and	hold-up	problems	in	investment.
	
	
	
	
LSE Business Review: Should companies reward CEOs for being lucky? Page 2 of 2
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-08-23
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2018/08/23/should-companies-reward-ceos-for-being-lucky/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/
